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I. INTRODUCTION
Alex and John are good friends. Both Alex and John live in the same
city in California, but they have different ways of connecting to the
Internet through different Internet Service Providers (ISPs). They even
have different cell phone providers. Alex and John constantly talk to
each other when playing computer video games using Voice-Over-
Internet Protocol (VoIP), which allows phone calls to be placed over the
Internet rather than traditional phone lines.
When John takes a trip to Europe, he brings along his computer. He
intends to talk to Alex using his computer with the same VoIP they used
in California. That way they can chat about the trip and maybe play a
game or two online. However, when John attempts to connect and call
Alex, he finds that the call is "patchy," there is a substantial delay, and
occasionally a lost signal. Yet, the unpredictable nature of the VoIP
connection has nothing to do with the physical distance or quality of the
lines. John may not know it, but the VoIP application that he is using is
not favored by Alex's ISP in California for connections originating from
overseas. In fact, Alex's ISP has an exclusive contract with a VoIP
software application company that makes sure that only the preferred
VoIP works uninterrupted for calls originating from overseas. The
preferred VoIP company always gets priority on the network and works
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perfectly. In fact, Alex's ISP advertises on its website that the preferred
company is the best-working VoIP for its subscribers, and it can be
"bundled" when paid for with other services.
Obviously, this scenario illustrates a common concern about networks
that discriminate against content and services. But, what if Alex's ISP
decides to block the non-preferred traffic outright? What if it takes a
middle road and only sometimes blocks the non-preferred traffic
completely, makes it "patchy," or actually allows it without interruptions,
especially when other traffic is low? Is that discrimination? Or is it
merely a tiered network for those that are willing to pay more?
Consider this scenario: Alex and John still are avid video game
players and play hours a day, each connecting from the same town
through different ISPs. However, since it is a peak Internet traffic time,
it may be difficult for them to play. While Alex has the "Diamond"
package from his ISP that ensures he has guaranteed high-bandwidth
connection, John's ISP does not offer anything other than regular
residential service. John must compete with everyone else in his local
area for bandwidth, including a few who constantly watch high-
definition video-on-demand and subsequently constrain bandwidth for
other users. Would it not be a great solution for John to buy a better
package that would ensure that he has a guaranteed connection like
Alex? Perhaps he could, but it might take a network that discriminates
based upon traffic and that is decidedly not enshrined with "network
neutrality."
A. What is Net Neutrality?
The term "network neutrality" was coined by Columbia Law Professor
Tim Wu to describe the effort by adherents of an "open access"
communications platform to treat all data on a network equally.' The
term has since been co-opted into a concept or a movement that espouses
treating all Internet sites, sources, data, and players equally, regardless of
the perceived importance of the content.2 In other words, an e-mail sent
1. Michael J. Tonsing, The Internet as You Knew It May Have Died Last Month,
and You Didn't Even Know It, FED. LAW., Jul. 2006, at 12, 12; Tim Wu, Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 141 (2003).
2. See Tonsing, supra note 1.
to a family member would have as much priority as an electronic money
transfer, or even a webcast discussing a national security threat.3
Proponents of a neutral network seek the government's role in
ensuring that the "open access" net neutrality principle is respected.
Critics of the "open access" neutral network, meanwhile, state that
regulation is unnecessary and is likely to hinder broadband network
development. Perhaps coincidentally, both advocates and opponents of
network neutrality state that they are "saving the Internet" either from
the discrimination of self-serving corporations or needless regulation by
the government, respectively.
5
The dualistic reaction to network neutrality has created a situation
where both sides are trying to "save the Internet" without knowing the
actual consequences of regulation or the lack thereof on the marketplace
for content distribution. Juxtaposed upon this debate is Wu's argument
that the regulatory decision for an individual network is not necessarily
between a network that is completely open or completely closed, but
instead, should be based on how a network treats outside content in
relation to its own content.
6
This Comment examines the above issues in the context of the regulatory
environment surrounding the net neutrality in the United States and
Europe. The focus is on the international ramifications of different
proposals and a critique of the United States' statutory neutrality
solution. Part II provides an overview of the Internet's development, the
historical role of telecommunications companies, and the regulatory
environment. Part III focuses on the background of the issue and on the
arguments of the players campaigning for and against net neutrality.
Part IV reveals various proposals for solving the net neutrality debate in
the United States and internationally, with an emphasis on various
consequences of previous regulations and their application to potential
United States neutrality legislation. The Comment concludes in Part V
by showing that proponents on both sides of the debate are misguided in
their basic assumptions. It proposes that the real solution should come
3. Although there are at least seven different distinctive meanings to which net
neutrality is attributed, this article will focus primarily on consumer concerns which
include the "selectivity by the carriers over content they transmit" and the
"discrimination on content providers who compete with the carriers' own content." Eli
Noam, A Third Way for Net Neutrality, FiN. TiMES, Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/acfl4410-3776-11 db-bc01-0000779e2340.html.
4. Wu, supra note 1, at 141.
5. For the views of those who advocate network neutrality, see Save the Internet:
Fighting for Internet Freedom, http://www.savetheintemet.com (last visited Oct. 18,
2007); Defend Network Neutrality, http://www.defendnetneutrality.org (last visited Oct.
18, 2007). For the views of those opposed to network neutrality, see Hands Off the
Internet, http://www.handsoff.org/blog (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
6. See Wu, supra note 1, at 143-44.
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in the form of the adoption of several coordinated steps designed to spur
competition and keep Internet content and services accessible to consumers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Internet
The regulatory frameworks and policy considerations surrounding the
net neutrality debate revolve around the system architecture that began
with phone-line networks and expanded to broadband and wireless.7
Early networks adopted two distinct features, the end-to-end principle
and discrimination based upon tiered networking.8 These features not
only shaped the way data was transmitted, but also formed the basis for
how people envisioned the Internet as an information conduit. The
following section briefly describes how these concepts work and their
crucial importance to the net neutrality debate.
1. The Dumb Network: End-to-End Principle
A key difference between the Internet and a traditional telephone
network is where the "intelligence" of the network lies, or in other
words, how the network knows which data goes where. 9 In a telephone
network, the intelligence is centralized at various circuit switches which
route calls based upon call routing numbers. 10 In contrast, Internet
intelligence resides at the ends of the network. There, a user's device or
server does the heavy lifting and determines if the received data is
intended for it." This leads to the phenomenon of the so-called "dumb"
network, first identified by Jerome Saltzer, David Clark, and David Reed
in their seminal white paper, End-to-End Arguments in System Design,
7. See Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality 2 (Jul. 6, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Center for Information Technology Policy
Department of Computer Science, and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, Princeton University), available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.
pdf [hereinafter Architecture of Network Neutrality].
8. Id. at3.
9. JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOM POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 170 (2005).
10. Id.
11. Id.
identifying the architecture of file-transfer networks.' 2 At each point in
this "dumb" network, data is merely noted as to its destination and is
then sent on its way, with complete indifference as to the nature of the
data or its priority. 13 At this point, if the location where the data is sent
is occupied by another outgoing message, or packet, the information is
"buffered" and stored in the memory of that point, or router. 14 When the
destination is available, the packet is sent. However, when packets
arrive more quickly than they can be sent and buffering has used all the
memory in the router, new incoming packets are completely dropped,
leading to message failures.' 5 This type of "dumb" network data transfer
was originally identified for its reliability, 16 but it has the additional
benefit of establishing a content neutral platform because there is no
hierarchy of message priority, other than the familiar first-come, first-
served priority system.'7
Some argue that this "dumb" network principle is fundamental to the
success of the Internet and is responsible for the invention of new
services and the Internet's hyper-growth.18 Noted net neutrality commentator,
Lawrence Lessig, views this principle as the defining characteristic of
the Internet and cites three critical benefits. 19 First, since applications
only run at the ends of the network, a new innovator or entrepreneur
needs only to connect to the Internet at any point to be able to display
and subsequently sell his wares without permission or payment to an
intermediary. Second, since the network is not optimized for any
existing applications, there is no inherent barrier to entry for the new
innovator. Third, the network actually can not discriminate against a
rival's application or product, essentially forcing a neutral platform for
competition.20
The benefits of the "dumb" network can be illustrated in an example
of a hypothetical small town. The town has a Main Street containing the
12. Id.; see J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed & D.D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in
System Design 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277, 277-78 (1984),
available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf.
13. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 170.
14. Architecture of Network Neutrality, supra note 7, at 2.
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. See Saltzer, Clark & Reed, supra note 12.
17. But see Christopher S. Yoo, Promoting Broadband Through Network Diversity
3-4 (Feb. 6, 2006) (research paper prepared for the National Cable and Telecommunications
Association), available at http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=286 (advancing the
argument that the first-come, first-served model enshrined in the end-to-end principle is
not actually neutral because it inherently disadvantages applications that are less tolerant
to disruptions and buffering).
18. See David S. Isenberg, The Dawn of the "Stupid Network," NETWORKER,
Feb./Mar. 1998, at 24.
19. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 9, at 170.
20. Id.
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its commercial hub. In this real world example, only a limited number
of stores can exist on Main Street. Many stores will not be located on
Main street, but instead on smaller, less traveled side streets. There is an
inherent advantage to being on Main Street because each store will get
more foot traffic and hence more customers. Additionally, Main Street
stores have better access to government services, such as police and fire
protection. The Main Street stores also have "curb appeal," attracting more
customers to their location in contrast to the dimly-lit, crime-ridden,
tinder-box back alleys where the less-desirable stores are found.
The "dumb" network essentially puts everyone on Main Street, from
the big-box retailer with dominant market power to the classic garage
21
startup company that has no customers and only a fledgling product.
However, since everyone has access to the benefits of doing business on
Main Street, even the garage startup company can quickly achieve a
dominant position with a superior application.22
2. The Application Layer and Tiered Networks
A second important concept in the development of the Internet is the
notion that networks operate on the Open System Interconnection (OSI)
model.23  In this model, there are layers of control which can be
separately managed within a network.24 In the net neutrality debate, the
21. This analogy obviously simplifies the situation because many large Internet
companies invest heavily in increasing bandwidth and other infrastructure that will
benefit their ability to compete. For example, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo are all
building massive data farms on the Columbia River in rural Oregon to tap the relatively
cheap price of electricity in that area. This will enable them to gain an advantage on
smaller upstarts who will pay higher prices for electricity, a key expense for large-scale
data-centers. See John Markoff & Saul Hansell, Hiding in Plain Sight, Google Seeks an
Expansion of Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/06/14/technology/1 4search.html?ex = 1307937600&en d96a72b3c5f9 1c47&ei
=5090#.
22. See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeremy W. Peters, Google to Acquire YouTubefor
$1.65 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.con/2006/10/09/
business/09cnd-deal.html?ex=l 318046400&en=d3f60bb3f976cfd0&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt
&emc=rss (noting the "meteoritic rise" of YouTube garnering over 50 million users in
less than a year); see John Plunkett, The Rise and Rise of YouTube, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Sept. 14, 2006, http://technology.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0, 1872411,00.
html (noting that YouTube was the fastest growing brand in the U.K. in the first six
months of 2006).
23. For a brief introduction to the OSI model, see Wdbop~dia, The 7 Layers of the
OSI Model, http://www.webopedia.com/quick-ref/OSILayers.asp (last visited Sept. 16,
2007).
24. Id.
most important layer is the application layer. The application layer is
also the most familiar to end-users because it supports applications such
as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP),
which respectively allow for file transfers and Internet web browser
usage. The key to the application layer is that it can be managed separately 25
and that it is unregulated by any United States' regulatory mechanism. 26
Tiered networks are important to net neutrality because they allow for
regulation of different layers of functionality a7 A tiered network would
allow an administrator or an automated switch to distinguish between
certain types of traffic and manage them accordingly. 28 This management
could include segregating "high priority" traffic to give a consumer a
higher quality of service (QoS) for high-bandwidth applications or
allowing telecom companies to essentially charge tolls for content from
certain non-preferred providers.2 9 An example of this type of recognition and
management of traffic is found in the common corporate network
environment, where the company uses application level restrictions to
limit traffic from certain websites and the downloading of files (for
example, filtering MP3s). 30 This "filtration" concept could be extended
to the wider Internet to give application level preference to people who
desire a higher QoS and may be willing to pay for it. While there may
be significant advantages to this model, it is decidedly non-neutral and
has significant drawbacks when an anti-competitive marketplace is
introduced.
25. Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Intemet Architecture
and the Law, U. San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 55, at 26, June
2003, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=416263.
26. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
968 (2005).
27. Solum & Chung, supra note 25, at 18.
28. Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on The Internet,
WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A23, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/07/AR2006060702108.html.
29. Editorial, The Web's Worst New Idea, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2006, at A14,
available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id= 110008391.
30. This filtration is similar to corporate networks which often have different
levels of filtration to give priority to traffic coming from certain preferred or high-end
users. See, e.g., St. Bernard Software, Berger Case Study, http://iprism.stbemard.com/berger-
case-study.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
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B. Historical Role of Telecom
1. Monopolies in the United States
The telecom sector in the United States has historically been understood
as a natural monopoly operating within a highly regulated environment.31
However, this simplification is only partially true. Traditionally, only
the so-called "last mile" telecommunications, or the wires or wireless
access that connects homes and businesses directly to the broader
network, has been subject to a natural monopoly, while the backbone
network has been somewhat more competitive. 32 The logic of why this
last mile monopoly has persisted is somewhat obvious. Few consumers
would want a multitude of different wires, which all provide virtually the
same service, entering their homes.
The major drawback of last mile monopolies is the potential for
economic abuse by companies with market power and limited competition.
Currently, the extent of real competition varies significantly by locality,
and even in wealthy urban areas, market power may be concentrated in
one major player.33
Some argue that the advent of increased competition in the distribution of
broadband is sufficient to overturn the historic last mile monopoly; such
a distribution would render net neutrality concerns feckless because a
truly competitive market will penalize non-neutral players.34 However,
this theory is predicated upon the idea that consumers want and will
demand a neutral network. Even if increased competition does indeed
create a default neutral standard because of consumer choice, without a
31. Michael A. Heller, The UNE Anticommons: Why the 1996 Telecom Reforms
Blocked Innovation and Investment, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 275, 280 (2005).
32. William H. Lehr, Sharon E. Gillett, Marvin A. Sirbu & Jon M. Peha, Scenarios
for the Network Neutrality Arms Race, Presented at the 34th Research Conference on
Communication, Information, and Internet Policy, (Aug. 31, 2006), available at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/561/TPRC2006_Lehr%/o20Sirbu%2OPeha%20G
illett%20Net%20Neutrality%20Arms%2ORace.pdf [hereinafter Network Neutrality Arms
Race].
33. Id.; see S. Derek Turner, Broadband Realty Check 11: The Truth Behind
America's Digital Decline, FREEPRESS, Aug. 2006, http://www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-
final.pdf (noting that significant problems exist in the methods that the FCC uses in
assessing broadband penetration and that many of the positive trending statistics, like
regional and price competition, are based on overly optimistic statistical models and do
not reflect reality).
34. Network Neutrality Arms Race, supra note 32, at 5-6.
concerted effort or regulation, pockets and even regions of non-neutrality
may still exist.35
2. Regulation
With a historic lack of real telecom competition in the United States,
the fear of monopolistic power is greatest in predatory price discrimination
and lack of incentives to evolve and extend telecom applications and
services.3 6 In order to mitigate these ill effects, the telecom sector has
always been heavily regulated.37 However, the sector was beset by
conflicting and overlapping regulations from states, the FCC, and
Congress.
In the 1996 telecom deregulation, Congress believed that increased
competition would result in decreased costs for access and enhanced
service. 39 However, giving up the traditional monopoly power and regulatory
regime has caused adverse effects in the industry. These include regulatory
battles and delays in the implementation of technologically feasible
services because of regulatory malaise. 40 The delay is regularly cited as
the reason why the United States trails numerous Asian and European
countries in broadband penetration.4 1 Shedding the yoke of monopolistic
power has been challenging for telecom companies in the United States
and the result ten years later is a realization that more "competitive choice"
is necessary in the deployment of broadband and other emerging
services.
42
35. However, in perhaps the initial salvo of the neutrality debate, Madison River
was sanctioned for attempting an explicitly non-neutral network. See Madison River
Communications, LLC, F.C.C. No. 05-543 (F.C.C. Mar. 3, 2005) (consent decree), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf [hereinafter Madison
River].
36. See Network Neutrality Arms Race, supra note 32, at 5.
37. See Andrew Odlyzko, Pricing and Architecture of the Internet: Historical
Perspectives from Telecommunications and Transportation, DIGITIAL TECH. CENTER, U.
MINN., Aug. 29, 2004, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/pricing.architecture.pdf.
38. Id; see CHARLES H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW xxv-xxvi (2d ed. 2001).
39. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2002).
40. See Heller, supra note 31, at 280-281.
41. See generally Rob Kelley, Broadband Lag Could Hurt the U.S., CNN
MONEY.COM, June 17, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/16/technology/broadband/
index.htm; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Broadband
Statistics to June 2006, http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,2340,en_2649_34223 37529673
1_11_1,00.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) (showing data from June 2006 where the
United States ranked 12th internationally in per-capita broadband penetration).
42. S. REP. No. 109-355, at 2 (2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp 109&sid=cp 109jpCLS&refer-&r-n=sr355.109&item=&sel=
TOC_3662&.
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3. Information Services vs. Telecommunication Services
In its effort to deregulate, the United States has been beset by a strange
dichotomy of regulation in regards to Internet and telecommunications
services. The confusion between Internet and telecommunication services
rests upon the regulatory distinction between the classification of a
"telecommunications service" and an "information service." 43 While the
line between these "services" and traditional telephone telecommunications
services are often undefined from a technical perspective, the classification
is extremely important. Telecommunication services, such as local and
long distance telephone service, are subject to substantial regulation.44
On the other hand, information services, which allow for Internet access
through ISPs and other advanced services, are free from regulation.45
This is an important concept for the current regulatory environment in
the United States because if a service is classified as an "information
service," it is essentially free from regulation.4 6 The recent trend in
classification has demonstrated a tendency to designate new technologies as
information services. In 2005, the Supreme Court in the Brand X
decision upheld the FCC's decision that cable modem service would be
classified as "information services" under the Telecommunications Act of
1996. 47 A few months later, the FCC classified DSL service as an
"information service," 48 thereby bringing DSL in line with cable modem
classification.49
The purpose of this change in designation was to "benefit American
consumers and promote innovative and efficient communications." 50 In
contrast, "telecommunications services" is subject to regulations that
43. Cherie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulatory Considerations for Cable-
Provided Voice Over Internet Protocol Services, 819 PLI/PAT 341, 347 (2005).
44. Network Neutrality Arms Race, supra note 32, at 4-5.
45. Daniel Tynan, Cable Vs. DSL: CNET's Guide to Choosing the Right Broadband
Connection, CINET REviEws, Dec. 3, 2002, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6536_7-
726601-1 .html (both DSL and cable services, although using separate physical hardware,
are commonly thought of as close substitutes); see 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (defining
"information service"); see 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (defining "telecommunications service").
46. See William G. Laxton, Jr., The End of Net Neutrality, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH.
REv. 10, 15 (2006).
47. Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 153; BrandX, 545 U.S. at 968.
48. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet et al., 20 Fed.
Commcn's Comm'n Rec. 14853 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter FCC DSL Classification
Order].
49. Tynan, supra note 45.
50. FCC DSL Classification Order, supra note 48.
require that it too "charge just and reasonable, nondiscriminatory rates to
their customers, design their systems so that other carriers can interconnect
with their communications networks, and contribute to the federal universal
service fund." 51
The difference between the purposes of these services is striking.
While the information service is consumer oriented and promotes the
obvious commercial aspects of innovation and efficiency, the
telecommunications service regulation is aimed at interconnectivity
and guaranteeing access. This distinction is a harbinger of the net
neutrality debate because advocates of neutrality want both classification
characteristics to guide the Internet.52 They cite the extraordinary benefits
of universal interconnectivity and access traditions of telecommunication
services, while at the same time, reveling in the triumph of the lucrative
commercial aspects of information services.53
a. Classification Example
The recent move by Verizon and BellSouth to "drop" universal
service fees is an example of the problem with the classification
system. 4 In the aftermath of the Brand X decision, broadband service
was classified as an information service, and the FCC no longer required
telephone companies to levy universal service charges.5 However, in a
nod to the market power enjoyed by these companies in the new deregulatory
environment, both Verizon and BellSouth instituted a substitute charge,
respectively called a "supplier surcharge" and a "regulatory cost recovery
fee.",56 Verizon even went so far as to explain to customers that the new
cost was not a government fee or tax, but instead was to help "offset
51. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975 (citation omitted).
52. See "Network Neutrality:" Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., 109th Cong. (2006) (prepared statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice
President and Chief Internet Evangelist Google, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
pdf/cerf-020706.pdf (exposing the commercial benefits of the Internet in relation to the
tradition of an open network) [hereinafter Vint Cerf Prepared Statement].
53. Id.
54. Verizon to Drop 'Supplier Surcharge,' MSNBC, Aug. 30, 2006, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/14588885/); Press Release, Verizon Announcement: Elimination of




55. Posting of Art Brodsky to TPM Caf6, http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog/special
guests/2006/aug/22/net neutralityplatitudesfrom the ftc (Aug. 22, 2006, 20:05 EST)
(universal service charges are required, and in 2006 were typically between $1.25 to
$3.00 per subscriber).
56. Id. (Verizon's fee was $2.70 monthly, and BellSouth's fee was $2.97, both of
which represent an actual increase in the average cost of service after the FCC allowed
these companies to reduce fees by declaring DSL service to be an information service).
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costs" charged by its network supplier, which, ironically, was Verizon itself.5 7
In response to numerous complaints from consumers and consumer groups
and a potential investigation by the FCC, both Verizon and BellSouth
announced that they would drop this fee.58
Another unintended result, at least partly caused by the archaic
telecommunications service classification system and the previous
deregulatory era, is the continued stickiness of prices in the Internet
access market.59 In 1996, the FCC simply deregulated the telecom industry
without ensuring the existence of a competitive market. In fact, the FCC
continued to allow local governments to regulate access to their markets,
despite the fact that they perpetuated monopolies by denying and60
holding up applications for the benefit of established parties. Without
the ability to enter new markets, mere deregulation will not, by itself,
increase competition, drive down costs for consumers, or provide better
61
service.
For example, despite the supposed competition between the cable and
DSL markets and the effect of the Brand X decision which made these
services equivalent, a pricing duopoly continues to exist.62 In fact, over
the last few years, driven by the "bundling" of multiple services, prices
generally have shown to be downwardly sticky, or rising much more
easily than dropping. 63 Thus, without real competition, deregulation and
confusing service classifications provide no real value for the consumer.
57. Brodsky, supra note 55.
58. Verizon to Drop 'Supplier Surcharge,' supra note 54.
59. See Art Brodsky, A Doupoly By Any Other Name..., PUB. KNOWLEDGE, July
10, 2006, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/518 (stating prices for Internet access
are perceived to be downwardly sticky because they are resistant to dropping).
60. See, e.g., FCC Video Vote Ruffles Cable Feathers, TV TECH. NEWS BYTES,
Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.tvtechnology.com/dailynews/one.php?id=4481 (noting that
local communities have traditionally blocked efforts to open up their control over cable
franchising).
61. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Rules to Ensure Reasonable Franchising
Process for New Video Market Entrants (Dec. 20, 2006), available at http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-2691 1 lAl.pdf. Many who question why the
price of cable service continues to climb and localized cable monopolies continue to
exist point to the efforts of local governments to thwart the adoption of new cable
licensing. FCC Chief Says Cities Block Cable Competition, MSNBC NEWS, Dec. 17,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16256478/.
62. Nate Anderson, Broadband Competition? Not So Much, ARS TECHNICA, July
12, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060712-7242.html.
63. See Brodsky, supra note 59; see also Editorial, Reading Between the Lines of
Sprint's New Surcharge, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 26, 2007, at A16 (noting
that when Texas raised corporate taxes, Sprint passed the fee onto consumers by
The lesson from the Verizon/BellSouth and "bundling" experiments is
that, if unchecked, companies, especially those with significant market
power, may defy government objectives by increasing costs and potentially
adding restrictions to a deregulated environment.
b. Emerging Technologies
The debate over information services will also presumably extend to
the emerging broadband technologies positioned to supplant cable modem
and DSL services. 64 These services include broadband over powerline
("BPL"), fiber optic, and wireless broadband.65 Some argue that the FCC
will regulate these emerging services to continually ensure the expansion
of service and universal connectivity.
66
However, a major concern of those who advocate net neutrality is that
the new classifications for broadband services will cause the FCC to end
common carrier regulations, opening up networks to discrimination
without FCC control.67 The FCC, perhaps realizing that it opened the
bag on this debate, has attempted to reassert dominance in regulation by
issuing several policy statements. In FCC Statement 05-151, the Commission
stated that it has "jurisdiction necessary to ensure that ... services are
operated in a neutral manner." 68 While the statement may appear to end
the debate on the net neutrality of "information service" networks, in
reality, it was merely precatory and is not currently enforceable. 69 In
fact, the FCC has recognized the lack of real enforceability and has
campaigned for the necessary authority.
70
including it as a government surcharge in addition to their advertised rates. However,
when a corresponding tax decrease was passed, Sprint did not pass the savings on to
consumers).
64. Laxton, supra note 46, at 9.
65. Id.
66. See generally Grant Gross, Broadband Network Neutrality: Advocates Push
For Policy, NETWORKWORLD, Mar. 26, 2004, http://www.networkworld.com/news/
2004/0326broadnet.html (advocating the adoption of FCC calls to regulate the
broadband industry).
67. See Laxton, supra note 46, at 14.
68. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet et al., 20 Fed.
Commcn's Comm'n Rec., 14986, 14988 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005).
69. Laxton, supra note 46, at 14.
70. Id. at 8 (quoting FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps that he prefers a "rule
that [the FCC] could use to bring enforcement action" instead of a mere Policy Statement).
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C. Network Freedom: The Four Freedoms
The major position by the FCC was articulated by ex-Commissioner
Michael Powell in his famous Four Internet Freedoms speech. 7' These
four freedoms are 1) the freedom to access content, 2) the freedom to run
applications, 3) the freedom to attach devices, and 4) the freedom to
obtain service plan information.72
The FCC has embraced these articulated freedoms in a recent case in
which Madison River, a local ISP, was blocking its customers' use of
Vonage's VoIP services.73 To settle the dispute, Madison River entered
into a consent decree with the FCC, agreeing to pay a fine and not to
block any VoIP services.7 4 The FCC based its arguments upon common
carrier regulation of broadband DSL as a telecommunication service.75
Ironically though, now that DSL is considered an information service,
Madison River could decide to once again block Vonage without
repercussion.76 As an interesting aside, Madison River had to consent to
allow all VoIP services, regardless of their origin, thus suppressing
potential discrimination based upon company or geography.77
1. The New Four Freedoms Restated
Soon after Powell's declaration, the new incoming FCC chairman,
Kevin Martin, restated the four freedoms in a more limited manner in an
official FCC policy statement. 78  The most significant difference was
Martin's shift in focus to the entitlements of consumers rather than
71. See Lawrence Lessig, Voice-Over-IP's Unlikely Hero, WIRED MAGAZINE, May
2005, at 91, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1 3.05/view.html?pg=4.
72. See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, Remarks at the
Silicon Flatirons Symposium on The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory
Regime for the Internet Age (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-243556A 1 .pdf.
73. See Laxton, supra note 46, at 9.
74. Madison River, supra note 35.
75. See Laxton, supra note 46, at 9; 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (defining a "common
carrier").
76. See Laxton, supra note 46, at 9-10.
77. Madison River, supra note 35.
78. See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Adopts Policy Statement:
New Principles Preserve and Promote the Open and Interconnected Nature of Public
Internet (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-260435Al .pdf [hereinafter FCC Martin Press Release].
generic freedoms. 79 This is most clear in the change to the fourth
freedom where Martin stated that "consumers are entitled to competition
among network providers, application and service providers, and content
providers., 80 This is an important distinction because instead of being
granted transparency into what a network provider may block or
"manage," the consumer is entitled only to the benefits of competition.
According to Martin, this is the best manner to ensure the expansion of
broadband access.
81
However, another important point in Martin's policy is that the four
freedom principles "are subject to reasonable network management. 8 2 What
qualifies as reasonable network management is up for discussion, yet
another statement made by Martin clarifies the constraint. Martin stated
that "[the FCC] must be vigilant in ensuring that the public safety, law
enforcement and consumer protection needs continue to be met. 83
Thus, according to Martin, neutrality freedom is not the goal of the FCC;
rather, the goal is to protect the consumers through law enforcement and
open competition.
2. Content Blocking
Despite the Madison River consent decree, ISPs are continuing to
discriminate against content, especially in emerging information services.84
For example, the three major third generation (3G) United States cellular
providers are completely blocking content from Slingbox's SlingPlayer
Mobile service.85 The service works by utilizing a device installed on a
consumer's set-top cable or satellite box and router. Working in
conjunction with SlingPlayer, the device sends a TV video feed to a
customer's cell phone so that he can watch TV directly from home no
matter where he is. However, Verizon, Sprint, and AT&T/Cingular have
79. Isen Blog: How Martin's FCC is Different From Powell's, http://isen.com/
blog/2005/08/how-martins-fcc-is-different-from.html (Aug. 7, 2005, 17:07 EST).
80. FCC Martin Press Release, supra note 78.
81. See Kevin Martin, United States of Broadband, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2005, at
A7, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-259927A1.pdf
(advocating the deregulation of telephone, wireless, cable and satellite providers to allow
competition for broadband services).
82. FCC Martin Press Release, supra note 78.
83. Martin, supra note 81.
84. See, e.g., Adam Livingstone, BitTorrent: Shedding No Tiers, BBC NEWS, May
30, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/5017542.stm (noting that
many ISPs have capped the bandwidth that customers can use when connecting to
BitTorrent); Nate Anderson, Skype Asks FCC to Open Up Cellular Networks, ARS TECHNICA,
Feb. 21, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070221-8895.html (noting that
Skype's VoIP service is being blocked by the major cellular providers).
85. Eric Bangeman, Slingbox Getting No Love From 3G Cellular Providers, ARS
TECHNICA, Feb. 28, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060228-6289.html.
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stated that they will not allow this service to access their networks. 86 A
spokesman for Verizon, Jeffrey Nelson, bluntly stated: "What runs on
our network are our services."
87
This outright restriction of content is a prime example of a non-neutral
stance. In order to block SlingPlayer, these companies have to analyze all
incoming IP traffic and discriminate based upon the application. 8 The
result of such activity is that "information service" providers may use
economic demands to either completely restrict end-user access to
content and services or hinder the success of such services by effectively
pricing competitors out of a market.
A second example of competitor restriction in the telecommunications
field can be seen in the content blocking reactions of network providers
to their competitors. In one example, telecom companies blocked a
discount conference call service, FreeConference.com from their
networks. The service allowed consumers to set up a conference call for
roughly the price of a long-distance call.89 Since conference calls are a
lucrative niche for telecom companies, the companies blocked customer
access to FreeConference.com's telephone number, under the guise that
FreeConference.com was violating their acceptable use policies. 90 For
example, AT&T/Cingular's policy states, "We may block access to
certain categories of numbers ... if, in our sole discretion, we are
experiencing excessive billing, collection, fraud problems or other misuse
of our network."91 While it may be feasible to envision a scenario where
competition for services would entail excessive billing, collection, or
fraud problems, 92 telecom companies essentially characterize the competition
as misuse and block content and services that evoke the competition.
86. Despite dire warnings that there is no added benefit to allowing the Slingbox
on a cellular network, 3 Group, a British cellular service provider, will allow Slingbox to
run on its network as part of a premium service package. See Slingbox Coming to European
Cell Phones, MSNBC.coM, Nov. 16,2006, http:/Avww.msnbc.msn.com/id/15747052/.
87. Bangeman, supra note 85 (noting that all three mobile operators have
competing video services).
88. See Eric Bangeman, SlingMedia on 3G and Mobile TV, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 3,
2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060303-6305.html.
89. Paul Kapustka, Cingular, Quest Blocking 'Free' Calls, GIGAOM, Mar. 15,
2007, http://gigaom.com/2007/03/15/cingular-qwest-blocking-free-calls/.
90. Id.
91. Id; Acceptable Use Policy, AT&T Wireless, Nov. 15, 2004, http://www.wireless.
att.com/learn/articles-resources/acceptable-use.jsp (last visited, June 3, 2007).
92. Martin H. Bosworth, AT&T Blocks Calls To Competing Conference Call Service,
CONSUMRAFFARS.COM, Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/03/
freeconference.html.
While telecom companies do have a vested interest in keeping their
lucrative conference call business, the dispute also involves an obscure
"termination fee," which the telecom companies contend they pay as
result of the discounted conference call service.93 However, after initially
blocking access to FreeConference.com, telecom companies were forced
to retreat after the FCC threatened them with formal legal action.94 Of
significant importance to the net neutrality debate is that major network
providers' first instinct in responding to competition and a perceived
imbalance (namely, paying termination fees) was to block content and
services without consumer or service provider recourse.
3. Disturbing Pattern in Canada
In addition to economic pressures, the use of content blocking to
suppress unpopular speech is a major concern of neutrality proponents. 95
For example, in Canada, during a union dispute against the Telus
telecom company, Telus blocked subscriber access to a pro-union
website. 96 The company defended its right to block the site by stating
that the site advocated financial harm to the company through strike
participation.97 However, Telus inadvertently blocked access to 766
other websites that were hosted on the same servers as the pro-union
website; this caused commentators to note that unintended consetquences
may occur when companies attempt to selectively block content.
The Telus case again demonstrates that lack of regulation may
actually increase the likelihood of discrimination by telecom companies.
The combination of unpopular speech restrictions and anti-competitive
economic practices call out for a neutrality policy that spans across
countries and includes room for regulation.
D. The European Experience
Until the 1980s, the traditional telecommunications market in Europe
was virtually a balkanization of state controlled monopolies, consisting
of both companies and regulatory agencies that controlled all forms of
93. Id.
94. Id.; Paul Kapustka, FCC Chairman Martin to Telcos: No Blocking Iowa Calls,
GIGAOM, May 3, 2007, http://gigaom.com/2007/05/03/fcc-commish-martin-to-telcos-
no-blocking-iowa-calls/.
95. See Tim Wu, The Filtered Future: China's Bid to Divide the Internet, SLATE,
July 11, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2122270/.
96. Telus Cuts Subscriber Access to Pro-Union Website, CBC NEWS, July 24,
2005, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/07/24/telus-sitesO5O724.html?print.
97. Id.
98. Tom Barrett, To Censor Pro-Union Web Site, Telus Blocked 766 Others, THE
TYEE, Aug. 4, 2005, http://thetyee.ca/News/2005/08/04/TelusCensor.
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telecommunication including voice and data.99 A watershed event for
the European community was the release of the Bangemann Report in
1994 which detailed the need for a strategy to increase interoperability
and deregulate the traditional state-owned telecom companies.'00 A
major component of the numerous recommendations made in this report
was the acknowledgement that the creation of the so-called "information
society," through the expansion of telecommunication and information
services, would have to be financed primarily by the private sector.'
01
This was a radical departure from the state-sponsored funding that had
traditionally characterized European telecommunications companies. 1
02
The end result was that regulators forced many of the state-controlled
monopoly companies or the recently privatized former monopolies to
share infrastructure and connections with new upstart rivals.' °3 This
move was intended to create an initial level playing field for startup
telecom companies to ensure some competition. 0 4 However, the actual
results show that the overwhelming number of former state monopolies
still have dominant positions in their original regions. 1
05
99. See Viviane Reding, Member of the Eur. Comm'n Responsible for Info. Soc'y
and Media, Address at the Annual Meeting of BITKOM: The Review 2006 of EU
Telecom Rules: Strengthening Competition and Completing the Internal Market (June
27, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECHI06/422
[hereinafter EU Telecom Review 2006].
100. See BANGEMANN REPORT, EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, May 26, 1994, available at www.
regiony.nck.pl/download.php?id=73.
101. See id.
102. See, e.g., BT Group, The Historical Development of BT, http://www.groupbt.
com/Thegroup/BTsHistory/History.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (noting that while
British Telecom's telecommunications monopoly in the United Kingdom officially
ended in 1984, the government did not fully divest ownership until 1993, and as of late
2006, BT is still the overwhelmingly dominant telecommunications carrier in the United
Kingdom).
103. See William Echikson, EU Calls to Rein in Former Telecom Monopolies,
CELLULAR-NEWS, June 27, 2006, http://www.cellular-news.com/story/1 8011 .php.
104. See id.
105. See Kevin J. O'Brien, Rivals Burrow Into European Telecom Monopolies,
INT'L HERALD TRiB., Nov. 6, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/22/business/
broadband23.php (noting that despite deregulation, merger activity and increasing competition,
former state monopolies continue to have overwhelming market share in their original
markets).
1. Europe Information Society and Media
The attitudes held by the European community markedly differ from
those held by Americans. Europeans focus less on consumer rights and
more on libertarian values of free speech.'0 6 In a declaration of European
telecom policy, Viviane Reding, the current European Union Commissioner
for Information Society and Media, stated that the overarching policy
goal in European Community telecommunications policy was the "need
to respect fundamental human rights and to protect freedom of expression."
10 7
The importance of this statement cannot be overstated. It stands in stark
contrast to FCC Commissioner Martin's theme of protecting consumers
and fostering competition. Conversely, Reding advocates human rights
through competition.
This contrast can be extrapolated into the net neutrality debate: Europe
emphasizes human rights and unfettered access to content while the
United States focuses on allowing consumers to make their own decisions
about what type of rights or content access they wish to purchase. The
interesting similarity is that both models suggest that less regulation and
more competition will accomplish these goals.'
0 8
However, the European Union has several structural challenges that
are not present in the federal United States' regulatory model. For
example, while the United States has a single regime for allocating
services, such as wireless spectrum management, Europe has 25.19
Additionally, European Union countries hinder deregulation by actively
supporting and attempting to regulate emerging technologies, 10 despite
the strict prohibition against such action in the seminal European Union
Communications Framework of 2002."'
106. Viviane Reding, Member of the Eur. Comm'n Responsible for Info. Soc'y and
Media, Address at the Internet Governance Forum: The Interet-Key to Freedom,
Democracy and Economic Development (Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/650 [hereinafter EC Key to Internet
Speech].
107. Id.
108. EU Telecom Review 2006, supra note 99 (advocating the increase in
competition as the only way to ensure that the Internet remains content neutral and free);
Martin, supra note 81.
109. EU Telecom Review 2006, supra note 99.
110. See Echikson, supra note 103; EU Telecom Review 2006, supra note 99
(arguing against the German efforts of restricting competition through their support for
the new VDSL network being built by the former state telecom monopolist Deutshe
Telekom).
111. See Council Directive 2002/21, On a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L108) 33 (EC), available
at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/Oftel/ind-info/eu-directives/framework.pdf
[hereinafter EU Communications Framework of 2002].
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E. Challenges to the European Community System
The European Union's attempt to create pan-European consistency in
the regulatory environment appears similar to the increased federalization of
telecom law in the United States. However, while the United States has
the ability to preempt local restrictions," 2 the European Commission is
stymied by sovereignty issues. "
3
European Community communications law is primarily governed by
the frameworks put in place in 1998 and 2002, which were intended to
ensure sustainable competition.' "4 Two core elements of these directives
are the separation of content and networks in the regulatory scheme and
the "pursuit of technological neutrality."
1 5
Separation of content and networks from the regulatory framework was
intended to offer the greatest opportunity for increased competition on
the network side. 16  This is because a member of the European
Community could not couple their network competition with specific
content that ran on that network. In essence, the European Community
has removed the technical regulation of the network and instead
implemented an economic regulatory environment based on neutrality. I
By instituting a policy of "technological neutrality," the European
Community's communications framework was established so that there
would be no preference for a particular technology over another as a
result of regulation." 18 The advantages of this goal are two-fold. First, it
allows the market to determine what technological standards will be
most desirable and adopted by consumers and businesses. Second, it
112. See TC Sys., Inc. v. Town of Colonie, NY, 263 F. Supp. 2d 471 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding in part that the federal Telecommunications Act preempted local
telecommunications rules).
113. See EU Telecom Review 2006, supra note 99.
114. See Mira Burri Nenova, The Law of the World Trade Organization and the
Communications Law of the European Community: On a Path of Harmony or Discord?
15, 31 (NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss Nat'l Ctr. of Competence in Research, Working
Paper No. 2006/08, 2006), available at http://www.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/publications
/wto_paper finalnccr.pdf.
115. Id.at32.
116. Id. at 39 n. 259 ("[T]echnological neutrality means that legislation should
define the objectives to be achieved, and should neither impose, nor discriminate in
favour of, the use of a particular type of technology to achieve those objectives.").
117. Id.at39.
118. Id.
allows for flexibility in the adoption of new technologies because the
regulatory framework is not wed to a specific form of communication. 1 9
1. A German "Regulatory Holiday"
Despite the laudable intention of the European Community's content
and network separation and technological neutrality, the European
Community still has significant enforcement challenges. For example,
German politicians have been pushing a so-called "regulatory holiday,"
which proposes that new markets should only be regulated if there is a
problem for sustainable competition in the "long term." 120 The intent of
this proposal is to protect a new Very High Digital Subscriber Line
(VDSL) network currently under construction by Deutsche Telekom
from European-wide competition.
121
The striking feature of the German provision is not that Germany
would seek to protect a former state telecom monopoly from competition,
but that the European Community Commission must make a pointed
lobbying effort to dissuade the German parliament from protecting the
former state telecom monopoly. 122 Despite the existing European
Community policy, German agreement as to the Commission's regulatory
powers, and Germany's status as the largest economy in the European
Union, the Commission currently does not have the enforcement power
to stop the German government from implementing the protectionist
telecom policy.123
2. Policy Impact on Net Neutrality
The impact of the European-style of neutrality on the network
neutrality debate is two-fold. First, as demonstrated by the "German
problem," without power to regulate, the European Community is
119. Id.
120. This proposal is the so-called "Paragraph 9a TKG" provision that the European
Community believes would result in re-monopolization of telecom networks. See
generally EC Key to Internet Speech, supra note 106; Kevin J. O'Brien, German
Parliament Approves Rules Banning Rivals from Deutsche Telekom "s New Network,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/15/business/
telekom.php.
121. EU Telecom Review 2006, supra note 99. For more information on the
concerns of the EC Commission, see Stefan Krempl, Widerstandgegen "Regulierungsferien"
fir die Telekom Wdichst Weiter, HEISE ONLINE, June 28, 2006, http://www.heise.
de/newsticker/meldung/74834.
122. See EU Telecom Review 2006, supra note 99.
123. However, the European Community can commence infringement proceedings.
See Tom Jowitt, EU Threatens Incumbents With Structural Seperation, COMPUTER Bus.
REV., Jun. 29,2006, http://www.cbronline.com/article-news.asp?guid=l 166875A-4FEE-4D47-
B26E-270BBA8D4EC1.
[VOL. 9: 167, 2007] Net Neutrality
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
impotent and cannot impose regulation that may be necessary to ensure
neutrality on par with a potential North American standard. 1 4 Second,
by seeking technological neutrality, coupled with content and network
separation, the European Community hopes to institute a default network
neutral environment by separating content and service from telecom
companies, an interesting idea untried in the United States.'25
F. Content Blocking in Europe
Despite claims that Europe has a content neutral tradition, content
blocking is an ongoing problem, 126 notably in Europe's emerging 3G
wireless market.'12  For instance, European mobile operators block VoIP
providers from using their networks to prevent the competing service.' 
28
The paradox of a content neutral tradition that tolerates content
blocking can be understood from two perspectives. Tolerating content
blocking is either a function of the 3G cellular company's market
position or an example of the spread of corporate-style "regulatory
holidays" which potentially pave the way for private networks to operate
in a non-neutral environment. While it is debatable which theory applies
124. The European Community has been only willing to take action against
companies that meet the threshold market share, currently situated at 25% of a definable
geographic region; thus, true neutrality, while theoretical, is not actually present. See
Thomas Kiessling & Yves Blondeel, The EU Regulatory Framework in
Telecommunications-A Critical Analysis, (June 15-16, 2008) (paper presented at the
ITC Semi-annual Meeting, Helsinki, Finland), available at http://itc.mit.edu/itel/pubs/
kiesslingpaper.pdf.
125. If United States' telecommunications and cable companies do not have their
own exclusive content they often pair with content providers to increase their "product
offerings." See, e.g., AT&T Yahoo! Broadband: What You Get, http://promo.yahoo.
com/att/what youget.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
126. Concerns about the European Union content neutrality commitment are well-
founded because the European Union has a tradition of blocking content that they deem
to cause harm. For instance, European Union countries have traditionally prohibited
common United States marketing content, including prescription drug advertising and
even comparative product advertising. Declan McCullagh, What Europe (still) Doesn't
Get, CINET NEWS.COM, June 21, 2004, http://news.com.com/What%20Europe%20(still)
%20doesn't%20get/2010-1028_3-5241683.html.
127. See Barney Lane, Does Europe Need Regulation to Preserve Net Neutrality?,
OvuM, May 15, 2006, http://www.ovum.com/go/content/c,62120,64174.
128. See id. However this problem is not merely confined to Europe. As previously
noted, in the United States, 3G cellular providers have been continuously blocking
services and content that either directly competes with one of their service offerings or
uses excess bandwidth without compensation. See Bangeman, supra note 85.
to the 3G market, it is certain that if Europe tolerates discrimination on
emerging networks, its tradition of neutrality will come to an end.
European content neutrality has also been challenged by nations who
attempt to impose country-specific laws on Internet content within their
borders.' 29 For instance, a French court famously fined Yahoo for not
complying with French law banning the sale of Nazi memorabilia within
the country.130 The justification for the fine was that French citizens could
access the website, even though the content was intended for a different
audience. While the case was settled out of court, the result was as
unsatisfying as that of the Canadian Telus case. Both show how unpopular
speech can easily be used as a justification for content blocking. Thus,
they demonstrate that potential free speech restrictions may be an
additional reason why neutrality regulations are required.'
3
'
G. Internet Governance Forum
An interesting corollary to the net neutrality debate comes from the
increasing efforts to establish a multi-national Internet governance
policy. 132 The effort was furthered in Athens, Greece in October of 2006
when the inaugural Internet Governance Forum was launched. 133 While
the forum primarily focused on expanding the Internet to accommodate
the ideas and opinions of "stakeholders" other than ICANN 134 and the
United States government, there was also a significant expectation that
network neutrality was obtainable on an international scale. However,
129. McCullagh, supra note 126. The general manager of an ISP in Germany was
convicted of trafficking in child pornography merely because the content passed through
his company's network. Brandon Mitchener, Ex-CompuServe Official Convicted in
German Court, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at B7. However, the conviction was
overturned on appeal because the court found there was no technological solution that he
could have used to block the pornography. Edmund L. Andrews, German Court Overturns
Pornography Ruling Against Compuserve, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1999, at C4.
130. McCullagh, supra note 126.
131. As previously mentioned, both Commissioner Martin and his European counterpart
have identified free speech and access to content as one of the most important benefits of
the Internet access.
132. See Christopher Wilkinson, Public Policy Issues in Internet Governance,
ONTHEINTERNET, Jan./Feb. 2002, http://www.isoc.org/oti/articles/1201/wilkinson.html.
133. See Nitin Desai, Dialogue Needed on Internet's Future, BBC NEWS, Oct. 30,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6081440.stm.
134. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the
organization responsibile for IP address allocation and other administrative functions
essential to the organization of the Internet. For more about ICANN, see http://www.icann.
org/tr/english.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
135. Note that many of the countries that are most critical of US-centric Internet
governance are also, according to many human rights groups, some of the most
repressive countries in the world, including Tunisia, Cuba, Iran, and China. Many fear
that the push for these countries to create an "International Internet policy" would
actually decrease openness and further a non-neutral agenda in order to restrict free
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critics commented that the Internet is doomed to balkanization because a
lack of net neutrality could allow for the development of rival
internets. 136
To remedy the threat of balkanization, the forum called for an
international online bill of rights that would be analogous to the rights
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 137  While
those proposing internationalizing Internet governance may have had
good intentions, a comparison to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is misplaced because the rights of a consumer to access the
Internet are not akin to freedom from slavery or the right to life and
liberty. 13
8
Yet, the relevance of the Internet Governance Forum resides in how
international organizations may try to dictate Internet policy. This is of
fundamental importance to the net neutrality debate because if technical
or content neutrality is proposed as an essential objective, United States
resistance will be more difficult and adherence to a particular position on
neutrality may be a pre-condition to international agreements. However,
the enforceability of any such declaration would be advisory at best and
potentially open to endless interpretation by the United States; thus, such
a declaration is a promising, but unlikely, solution.
39
expression into their countries. This effort may be akin to the recent undermining of
human rights by stocking the United Nations Human Rights Council with such notorious
rights abusers as Cuba, China, Zimbabwe, and Libya. See generally Mark P. Lagon,
Deputy Assistant Sec., Int'l Org. Affairs, Statement before the H. Int'l Relations Comm.,
Subcom. on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations: UN Human
Rights Council: Reform or Regression, (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.state.
gov/p/io/rls/rm/71839.htm; Kate Mackenzie, FT Briefing: Internet Governance, FIN.
TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2005, http://search.ft.com/ftArficle?ct=0&amp;id=051116006854.
136. Darren Waters, Warning Over 'Broken Up' Internet, BBC NEWS, Oct. 11,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6037345.stm.
137. Id.
138. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 72-73, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810, (Dec. 12, 1948).
139. The IGF was not set up as a decision making body. The Chairman of the
forum stated that "[n]o-one wants to duplicate a telecoms-type regulator on the internet."
Thus, the impact of the conference may be advisory at best. Waters, supra note 136.
H. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
United States' regulation of foreign telecommunications is generally
concerned with foreign ownership of United States' communication
services and the pricing structures of international agreements.140
Historically, there was substantial review of foreign telecom ownership
applications from competitive, foreign policy and national security
standpoints. 14  However, with the adoption of the WTO Basic
Telecommunications Agreement, 142 the landscape was noticeably simplified.
It created a rebuttable presumption that a WTO country's telecom
investment would be subject only to the same market power and competition
requirements applicable to companies in the United States. 143 The result
is that foreign telecom companies are treated the same as United States
companies.
Ominously, however, the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement allows a
country to place "reasonable conditions" on access and use of public
telecommunications networks to strengthen a country's internal services.
144
A country, rather than a corporation, may decide to create a non-neutral
network to further a native technology or protect a current or formerly
state-sponsored company. This could be an especially potent threat to
net neutrality in countries where there are only a few telecom players.
III. MOVING TOWARD NET NEUTRALITY
A. The Argument For Net Neutrality
As of late 2005 and 2006, there has been much commentary on the
supposed benefits of "continuing" the tradition of a neutral network.
145
The main advocates for a United States legislative solution have been
the large Internet companies, such as Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, eBay,
Amazon and IAC/InterActive.146 But, net neutrality advocates have made
140. See Kennedy, supra note 38, at 203-05.
141. Id. at 202.
142. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex on
Telecommunications, 33 I.L.M. 1125 at art. 5(a) (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/serv-e/12-tele.htm [hereinafter GATS Telecom Annex].
143. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 206.
144. GATS Telecom Annex, supra note 142, at art. 5(g).
145. For a collection of articles discussing net neutrality, see Net Neutrality
Showdown, CINET News.com, http://news.com.com/Net+neutrality+showdown/2009-
1028 3-6055133.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
146. Letter from Group of Internet Consumers, Content Providers, and Service,
Device and Application Companies to Joe Barton, Chairman of Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, and John D. Dingell, Ranking Member of
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 1, 2006),
[VOL. 9: 167, 2007] Net Neutrality
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
strange bedfellows with diverse groups such as MoveOn.org, the Christian
Coalition, American Library Association (ALA), and American Association
of Retired Persons (AARP). 1
47
While the parties have different reasons for supporting net neutrality
legislation, all agree on the main pro-neutrality argument of consumer
protection. Internet companies warn of the possibility of not being able
to access their content or having to pay for something that was traditionally
free. 148 Some special interest groups, such as the ALA, warn about a
more sinister outcome based upon First Amendment restrictions, where
supposedly undesirable information would be blocked for political,
ideological, or other reasons.'49
1. 95 Theses
Craig Newmark, founder of the ubiquitous classified ad and community
portal website, Craigslist.org, has compared the struggle for net neutrality to
the importance of the printing press to Martin Luther's posting of the 95
Theses.1 50 If Martin Luther had to pay a licensing fee to Gutenberg to
use the printing press, Lutheranism would not have developed because
the non-commercial 95 Theses would have been too expensive to post.'
51
This argument can be extended to the current net neutrality debate - in
an extreme scenario, if content distributors had to pay a licensing fee or
royalty to distribute their content reliably to the intended recipients, a
reduction and chilling of non-commercial speech may result.
available at http://static.publicknowledge.org/pdf/nn-letter-20060301.pdf [hereinafter
Opposition Letter].
147. See Press Release, Christian Coalition of America, Save the Internet.com &
MoveOn.org, When it Comes to Protecting Internet Freedom, the Christian Coalition and
MoveOn Respectfully Agree (June 16, 2006); ALA Network Neutrality, http://www.ala.
org/ala/washoff/WOissues/techinttele/networkneutrality/netneutrality.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2006) [hereinafter ALA Neutrality Views]; Anne Broache, Push for Net Neutrality
Mandate Grows, ZDNET, Mar. 17, 2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-
6051062.html?tag=nl.
148. Opposition Letter, supra note 146.
149. See Broache, supra note 147.
150. Craig's List Founder Compares Net Neutrality with Martin Luther, ENTERPRISE
OPEN SOURCE MAG., June 11, 2006, http://opensource.sys-con.com/read/233871.htm.
151. Id.
2. The Chinese Example
Another worry of neutrality supporters is the implementation of a
system that subtly filters content similar to that used in China. 5 2 While
various players in the United States and Europe push for a more neutral
and open Internet, Chinese authorities are increasingly attempting to
balkanize the Internet by quietly implementing measures that restrict
content. 153 Interestingly, the filtering in China goes beyond simple content
limitations, like restricting the words "democracy" or "freedom,"' 154 and
extends to the tools that allow the Internet to function, including search
engines, chat rooms, blogs, and email.
155
One of the intriguing questions about China is not why it blocks
content, but how a nation of over a billion people can effectively filter
content on a decidedly non-neutral platform. The answer lies in building
a massive firewall around the country and controlling access to the
Internet from a relatively small amount of access points. 56 At these
access points, Chinese officials have placed routers, sophisticated network
computers that "route" Internet traffic to the proper destinations.
However, instead of properly "routing" prohibited messages, services, or
data, the Chinese routers simply "lose" the information. 57 While intuitively
it may seem that "losing" messages would negatively affect the reliability
and performance of the Internet in China, it has the opposite effect. By
losing the message, the router does not have to repeatedly attempt to find
the destination, hence, actually improving Internet performance.
158
A second intriguing aspect of China's content blocking is the subtle
nature of the blocking. Instead of a filter indicating that the specific
content is blocked, blocking takes the form of a technical error.
1 59
Additionally, content blocking changes with current developments; for
example, the Wall Street Journal website may be intermittently available
152. Ethan Zuckerman, One Internet, Indivisible, INC. MAG., May 2006, at 29,
available at http://www.inc.com/magazine/20060501/views-opinion.html.
153. Wu, supra note 95.
154. Jonathan Watts, Microsoft Helps China to Censor Bloggers, THE GUARDIAN,
June 15, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,1506601,00.html.
155. Wu, supra note 95.
156. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 92-93 (2006).
157. Id. at 93.
158. Id. at 94.
159. Compare this method to the Saudi Arabian approach which explicitly informs
users that they are trying to view banned content, such as pornography, opposition
websites, or Israeli publications. See List of the 13 Internet Enemies, REPORTERS WITHOUT
BORDERS, Nov. 7, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id article=19603.
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depending on its content.1 60 Considering the unpredictable nature of the
Internet, a Chinese user may deem a technical error to be legitimate and
be unaware that the government is actually blocking the site.
161
The importance of China's policy is not necessarily in the political
dynamic of the country, but rather in the technical feasibility of filtering
the Internet on a massive scale. China has demonstrated that by subtly
masking filtration while maintaining service levels, a user's Internet
experience is not noticeably diminished. The result is an incredibly
effective way to prohibit content.
1 62
B. The Argument Against Net Neutrality
The counterargument to neutrality legislation turns on the concept that
network discrimination can be welfare enhancing.1 63 For example,
blocking malware traffic, such as harmful viruses, trojan attacks, service
attacks, malfunctioning devices congesting the network, and next
generation spain applications, would probably be applauded and paid for
at a premium by most end-users and businesses. 164 Additionally, time-
sensitive traffic, such as VoIP, is especially vulnerable to periods of low
bandwidth because even the slightest hiccup in traffic can render a
conversation unintelligible.165 The perceived remedy for these low bandwidth
periods is to guarantee a particular connection speed for those willing to
pay more. 66
One critic of potential net neutrality legislation, John Windhausen, Jr.,
has summarized the four main arguments against any net neutrality
legislation: 1) net neutrality legislation is a solution without a problem
160. Wu, supra note 156, at 94.
161. Id.
162. In the United States and the European Union, this type of filtration could
potentially be used by a local ISP to either block content outright or hinder a service to
the point where a user refuses to use it.
163. See Network Neutrality Arms Race, supra note 32, at 4.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Deb Shinder, Solution Base: Creating a Secure and Reliable VoIP Solution,
TECHREPUBuC, Aug. 1, 2007, http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/2415-1035_11-94844.html.
166. This discrimination is already occurring in the United States and Canada. For
example, the Canadian cable company Shaw has warned that VoIP users will encounter a
slow connection unless they "upgrade" to a $10-per month speed enhancement. Shaw
has a competing digital telephone service. Additionally, United States telecom companies
BellSouth and AT&T have announced plans to sell "premium" network services that
deliver video from preferred providers faster than video from others. See Zuckerman,
supra note 152.
because Internet development and expansion is still proceeding unabated;
2) the potential blocking/filtering of spam and viruses are significant
benefits of a non-neutral platform; 3) since substantial investment has
been made into the broadband deployment by telecom companies, those
risk-taking companies should be able to make a reasonable return; and 4)
net neutrality does not foreclose the ability to charge for a private
Internet - it only guarantees that everyone would have the ability to
choose to pay for it, or not.
167
An additional consideration against net neutrality legislation is the
likelihood of content discrimination by telecom companies. When
pressed, most companies have taken a measured approach in response to
any potential non-neutral strategies.168 Several companies have assured
the public that they would never discriminate based upon content. 169
Nonetheless, others have seemingly reserved the right to discriminate,
and their effort to block neutrality legislation is noticeable.' 70 Of paramount
concern is whether any potential content blocking or filtration would be
a financially self-defeating policy for a telecom company because
consumers, assumingly informed of content blocking and filtration
mechanisms, would choose a company which does not discriminate over
one that does. However, this scenario assumes both that consumers will
be informed of any content blocking or filtration mechanisms and that
there will be significant comparable Internet connection services in the
geographic area to allow for real consumer choice.
C. The Middle: Can you be Neutral on Net Neutrality?
As the net neutrality debate has heated up, some have said that the
debate has become so polarized that there is no "neutral" ground.' 7' One
commentator has compared the net neutrality debate to the debate over
universal socialized healthcare, in which supposedly no middle ground
167. John Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband: Preserving an
Open Internet Through Net Neutrality, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, Feb. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf.
168. See Gavin O'Malley, Non-Neutral Net A Boon To Monitoring Companies,
ONLINE MEDIA DAILY, Mar. 9, 2006, http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfmn?fuse
action=Articles.showArticle&art aid=40755.
169. See Vint Cerf Prepared Statement, supra note 52, at 5 (stating that the
historical position of telecom companies was to "never discriminate against application
providers").
170. O'Malley, supra note 168.
171. See Michael Grebb, Neutral Net? Who Are You Kidding?, WIRED, May 31,
2006, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/intemet/0,71012-0.html (commenting on
the increasingly polarized debate in net neutrality).
[VOL. 9: 167, 2007] Net Neutrality
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
exists. 172 However, several telecommunication infrastructure companies,
such as Coming, Motorola, Cisco Systems, Nortel Networks, and
Qualcomm, have attempted to voice a middle ground, stating that it is
too soon for any net neutrality legislation because the extreme scenarios
presented by both sides of the debate have not come to fruition. 173 But,
is delay really middle ground? Or is it an attempt to see how the market
for advanced network services will play out? Or alternatively, is the
argument the same as that of the telecom industry, that net neutrality is a
solution without a problem?
It is important to note that there is substantial financial incentive for
companies such as Cisco Systems to advocate for a non-neutral network
because of the potential for sales of new hardware devices. 174 Hence,
much of this rhetoric is seemingly disingenuous. 175  Since delayed
neutrality legislation is really acquiescence to a non-neutral network, a
middle ground advocated by industry equipment manufacturers is really
a vote for a discriminating network. Thus, like universal socialized
healthcare, net neutrality may not have any middle ground.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Any proposed solution to the international net neutrality debate must
balance competing forces to achieve the holy grail of telecommunications
policy: competitively low prices for almost universal access, high
bandwidth, an encouraging environment for new cutting-edge services,
and access to all content without restriction. The following section
includes critiques of the proposed solutions and offers a hybrid solution.
172. See Telecom Trends: Is Net Neutrality like Universal Healthcare?, http://
mhgoldberg.com/blog/2006/03/is-net-neutrality-like-universal_19.html (Mar. 19, 2006
17:29:00 EST). The maxim states that you're either for free healthcare for everyone, or
you're against it, and for privatization.
173. See Anne Broache, Tech Manufacturers Rally Against Net Neutrality, CINET
NEWS.COM, Sept. 19, 2006, http://news.com.com/Tech+manufacturers+rally+against
+Net+neutrality/2100-1028_3-6117241 .html?tag-nl.
174. Cisco Systems, The Cisco Service Exchange Framework: Providing Greater
Control for Cisco IP Next Generation Networks (Apr. 2005) (White Paper, on file with
author) (explaining how adoption of the new Cisco framework can allow for a network
operator to "granularly" track individuals and deliver them value-added services
approved exclusively by the operator).
175. For a summary of industry White Papers showing potential non-neutral plans
for broadband Internet, see Center for Digital Democracy, http://www.democraticmedia.
org/issues/netneutrality.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
A. Eminent Domain
Some believe that only a radical change in the ownership model of the
telecom industry can ensure an optimal level of neutrality. 17 6  In his
satirical commentary, Andy Kessler stated that networks should be
seized from the United States' telecom industry by applying the recent
Supreme Court precedent in Kelo v. City of New London.' The Kelo-
derived principle of taking property for a "public purpose"' 178 would
eliminate the so-called evils of the current telecom industry: stagnant
service innovation and predatory monopolist pricing. 179  Under this
principle, all private telecom communication lines and equipment would
be scooped up by the government, which would ensure that neutrality is
enforced. 1
80
While this solution might be an attractive way to start from scratch in
the telecom industry, governments should encourage competition in the
telecom industry, not stifle it. Additionally, while seizing networks may
reduce the price consumers pay for Internet access and ensure a neutral
network, it is likely to be widely criticized and become even more




The lingering lesson from Kessler's proposal is that by suggesting a
radical seizing of the network, the preference for a market-based
solution in the form of telecom deregulation is revealed. 182 However,
the current, uncompetitive environment, combined with a more limited
government role, will lead to less consumer choice and protection, not
more. 183  Therefore, the government must take a more active role in
176. Andy Kessler, Give Me Bandwidth ... No One to Root For in the Net Neutrality
Debate, WKLY. STANDARD, June 26, 2006, at 24, available at http://www.weeklystandard.
com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=12348&R=ECCBA034.
177. See id.
178. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
179. Kessler, supra note 176.
180. See id.
181. See Warren Richey, Next Big Test of Power to Seize Property?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 2, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0102/p02s0l-
usju.html (detailing that since the Kelo decision 34 states have passed laws restricting the
use of eminent domain for private development, and the decision has been widely
criticized).
182. The concept that less regulation leads to the ultimate goals of increased
competition, lower prices, and more innovative service was a fundamental purpose of the
1996 Telecommunications law. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151.
183. See generally Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation
Before Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer Disaster, Consumer Federation of
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regulation based on the perceived public good, not on redistribution of
wealth from telecom companies to Internet companies, or vice versa.
However, as previously demonstrated, mere deregulation does not necessarily
accomplish these intended goals. 184 Thus, if a neutrality policy is to be
in effect, regulation must play an essential role; implementing a market-
based solution is not enough. 85
Of particular note, pricing regulation in the Internet industry is a
complicated matter because the market is dual-sided, meaning that both
content providers and consumers pay portions of the cost to deliver
service. Therefore, any policy that attempts to regulate the pricing on
one side will likely shift the burden to the other, potentially resulting in
no net benefits to consumers. Hence, pricing regulation should not be a
goal of a neutrality policy, and efforts to couple new service classifications
or a showing of market power with a pricing cap or a similar restriction
are suspect. 
186
C. Statutory Interconnection Proposal
Some fear that a strict neutrality rule dictated by legislation would be
excessive in addressing content and service interference and blocking
America, Feb. 2000, http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/lesson.pdf (opining that in many
sections of the United States, deregulation has led to less competition and less consumer
protection).
184. Id.
185. See Letter from Tim Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. Of Law &
Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y,
Fed. Commc'ns. Comm., (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://www.timwu.org/wu_
lessigfcc.pdf (advocating a regulatory environment that enshrines a content neutral
platform with some market-based decision making by ISPs, including bandwidth and
other local restrictions); see also Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Senior Vice
President, AT&T Servs. Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm., (Dec.
28, 2006), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ATT'_FINALMergerCommitments12-28.pdf.
[hereinafter AT&T Consent Decree] (to expedite the merger of two of the largest players
in the cable and telecom industry, the FCC required regulation concessions favoring a
neutrality stance). But see Adam D. Thierer, "Net Neutrality" Digital Discrimination or
Regulatory Gamesmanship in Cyberspace?, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Jan. 12, 2004, at 22-23,
http://www.cdt.org/speech/net-neutrality/20040112thierer.pdf (opining that there is a
role for regulation in the net neutrality debate, but that role is limited exclusively to
ensuring open competition rather than establishing neutrality principles; Thierer calls for
a market-based solution to network neutrality).
186. See generally Robert W. Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, The
Empirical Case Against Asymmetric Regulation of Broadband Access, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 953 (2002) (arguing that the asymmetrical regulation of broadband in the
United States has not produced pricing benefits to consumers).
concerns. As such, several commentators have sought a middle ground
that does not explicitly call for neutrality.' 87 One such solution is James
Speta's proposed statutory interconnection rule that would require
Internet carriers to "interconnect" with other carriers when a carrier's
market power threatens competition.'88 This rule would require an Internet
carrier (both local ISPs and long-distance connectors) to transport or
transit IP-based traffic on an equal footing with any other traffic sold by
the carrier to retail customers, where there is evidence that the carrier
has "market power" within that geographical or service delivery area.'
89
For example, if Verizon has market power in a specific location and
provides a for-sale video-on-demand service, it would have to allow a
competing company to provide a similar service on the same footing. In
order to implement the rule in the United States, the FCC would need the
authority to oversee such interconnection relationships and would need
to be given enforcement powers.'
90
Since under this proposal a network carrier would only have to allow
for interconnectivity if it had a substantial share of the retail market,
non-neutral private or public networks could be set up entirely as non-
neutral, as long as they had a relatively smaller market share and had no
end-user business or consumer users. 19' The result of this proposal is
clear: a neutral network would be created not through legislative fiat,
but, instead, by pressure from competition. 92 For instance, it is conceivable
that the larger and more dominant a telecom company became in a
certain area, the more open its network would be for outer-network
services and content because limiting services and content would render
it in violation of the interconnection rule. Generally, the most successful
companies would not be those that favored their own services over
187. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 1, 76-77 (2005).
188. James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and
Limiting It, 35 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 15, 32 (2003).
189. Id. at 32-33.
190. Despite statements supporting the advancement of neutrality, the FCC was
only able to get a two-year commitment on neutrality from AT&T by using the FCC's
power to hold up the AT&T-BellSouth merger as leverage. However, the concession by
AT&T is heralded as a stepping stone toward net neutrality legislation. Currently, there
is no FCC power to enforce a rule like the proposed statutory interconnectivity rule,
although it may be possible to create a default rule under FCC Title I authority. See K.C.
Jones, AT&T Merger Contains First Net Neutrality Guidelines, TECHWEB, Jan. 2, 2007,
http://www.techweb.com/showArticle.jhtml?article
ID=196800499; see also Speta, supra note 188, at 29, 33.
191. Jones, supra note 190.
192. However, since content discrimination is more plausible when there is a
substitute competing service, an anti-discrimination rule such as the interconnection
proposal argues more for antitrust and anticompetitive practice enforcement than it does
for an entire wide-reaching neutrality regime.
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others but would instead be the companies with the most open access. 193
Thus, a network carrier's incentives would be aligned with open access
and increased bandwidth to ensure that the company could accommodate
the new services and content accessed by their customers.
Additionally, FCC enforcement of this interconnectivity rule would
ensure that a carrier did not resort to content or service discrimination
without harming its own interests. Without FCC enforcement, the
interconnection rule would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement
because it runs contrary to the usual economic incentives of a company
possessing market power. Therefore, FCC oversight would play an




Despite the benefits noted above, the statutory interconnection
proposal has several flaws. The primary flaw is that despite some claims
to the contrary, the framework of the Internet is already non-neutral; the
end-to-end architecture and best efforts delivery mechanism are
inherently non-neutral.195 For instance, while the "best efforts" mechanism
helps to ensure that all messages have a chance to be successfully
received, although there may be a mild delay, a bandwidth-sensitive
service such as VoIP or streaming web video is consistently thwarted by
193. The reason underlying this theory is that successful companies would either be
niche players without significant market power or would have to be entirely open to
competing content and services. Here, success is generally equated with expansion of a
company's network and acquisition of new customers. It does not refer to corporate
profitability or other financial measurements, which may be significantly higher at a
smaller "niche" company.
194. A tertiary result of interconnection regulation would be the possible
establishment of private networks in niche markets. Thus, many of the touted benefits of
a non-neutral network would be realized in potentially lucrative services, such as high-
definition gaming or telemedicine. See Robert E. Litan, Catching the Web in a Net of
Neutrality, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/01/AR2006050101061.html; Ken Fisher, AT&T Sees Benefits to
Tiered Internet Service, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 12, 2006, http://arstechnica. com/news.ars/
post/20060112-5965.html (citing comments by an AT&T spokesman who stated that
gainers would benefit from a network that controls the QoS connection). But see Tony
Greenberg & Alex Veytsel, Every Time You Vote Against Net Neutrality, Your ISP Kills
a Night Elf, RAMP RATE, Nov. 18, 2006, http://www.ramprate.com/marketcommentary/
RRMarketCommentaryGamingandNetNeutrality.pdf (arguing that without net neutrality,
the future of online gaming is doomed).
195. Yoo, supra note 187, at 21.
the system's design. Thus, while the Internet may be historically neutral
as to raw content, it has never been neutral as to uses and services.
196
The problem of establishing interconnectivity in the current environment
of non-neutral policies 97 is evident when a company has competing
services over a widely dispersed region. Instead of finding that a company
has market power in a certain location for Internet access, such as is
done in the European model, the FCC might be placed in the unenviable
position of determining whether a particular company was impeding
upon customer access to the bandwidth-intensive service of a competitor
which had an equivalent offering in another medium. For instance,
suppose that Verizon, a wireless phone operator with significant land-based
ISP customers, decided to block high-definition, Intemet-based, European
soccer videos from being accessed on its wireless network, in response
to market research showing that customer access to such videos would
negatively affect the number of pay-per-view purchases on cable
television for similar soccer matches. Would this be a violation of the
interconnection proposal? The query might rest upon whether Verizon
has market power in that particular area, regardless of its delivery of
equivalent services. Additionally, the ambiguities of what constitutes
"market power" would also complicate any potential action in a fast-
changing technological environment. The likely result may be so much
confusion that uncompetitive interconnection rules would be ignored
except in the most obvious cases.
2. European Union Interconnection Law
The largest flaw in the statutory interconnection proposal is the risk
of non-reciprocation by the European Union. While the European Union
Interconnection Directive guarantees that all European Union companies
must have a equal playing field for implementation of their networks in
other European Union states, 198 it does not guarantee the same service
level for foreign services and takes a less liberal view of content and
service blocking.' 99 Moreover, the European Union Interconnection
196. See Grebb, supra note 171.
197. For example, Verizon was sued in late 2005 for allegations that it was
improperly blocking email from parts of Europe and Asia in order to potentially cut
down on spam. Verizon settled in April 2006 and agreed to change the way that it
blocks spam, while admitting no wrongdoing. See Verizon Offers Refunds For Blocked
Emails, ENT NEWS, Apr. 5, 2006, http://entmag.com/news/article.asp?EditorialslD=7323;
see also Verizon Class Action Settlement, http://www.emailblockingsettlement.com (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007).
198. Council Directive 97/33, art. 6, 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32.
199. See, e.g., John Oates, AllofMP3 Hit by Danish Court Ruling, THE REGISTER,
Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/10/26/itnueski banned (noting that a Danish
court issued a ruling that forces an ISP to block customer access to a foreign website).
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Directive merely states that one user will have the ability to communicate
200
with another, but it does not guarantee a level of service.
American-style free speech and content neutrality is not a value held
in the same level of esteem by the European Union. While the United
States could adopt a de facto neutral policy by implementing an
interconnection rule, Europe would likely require a myriad of exceptions
that would violate the spirit of Speta's interconnection proposal.
D. Tiered Services Regulation
Another potential solution to the neutrality debate is the so-called
Tiered Services Regulation option, proposed jointly by Rob Atkinson
and Phil Weiser that purports to offer a middle ground.2 0' Atkinson and
Weiser propose a three-part plan first defining what actually constitutes
"broadband" Internet service; second, proposing tax incentives to encourage
development of increased bandwidth; and finally, requiring FCC review
and enforcement of anti-competitive agreements and policies.20 2
First, determining what actually constitutes "broadband" service is an
important aspect of any international policy.20 3 Services are no longer
exclusively defined as "information services" or "communication services,"
as distinguished in the Brand X decision.20 4 While Atkinson and Weiser
propose that the standard for "broadband" service be set at a speed of
2Mbps, the real importance of a minimum standard is in the effort to
actually set one at all.205 If the United States truly wants a competitive
200. Statement Issued by the Dir. Gen. of Telecomm., Rights and Obligations to
Interconnect Under the EC Interconnection Directive, Apr. 1999 (on file with author).
201. Carol Wilson, Think Tank Offers Net Neutrality Answer, TELEPHONY ONLINE,
June 1, 2006, http://telephonyonline.com/broadband/regulatory/net-neutralityitif_060106.
202. Id.
203. The definition of "broadband" generally differs from country to country and
has fluctuated over time. The FCC classifies a broadband service as any service that
exceeds 200Kbps. Federal Communications Commission, High-Speed Internet Access-
"Broadband," available at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/highspeedintemet.
html (last visited, Sept. 20, 2007).
204. The European Union has no such distinction between information and
communication services. See Council Directive 97/33, supra note 198.
205. Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A Third Way on Network Neutrality,
13 THE NEW ATLANTIS 47, 56 (2006). While the International Telecommunications
Union defines broadband at a primary rate of 1.5 to 2.0 Mbps, the FCC defines it at less
than ten times that speed, with a mere 200Kbps qualifying as broadband. See
International Telecommunication Union, Birth of Broadband-Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/birthofbroadband/faq.html, (last visited Sept. 20, 2007);
Internet experience with the European Union, there should be cooperation
or parallel interpretations of a minimum standard for broadband that is
adjusted in regular time intervals. This cooperation would lead to
legitimate comparisons of networks and an even starting point for any
neutrality legislation. However, guaranteeing a level of service or
defining a broadband standard is something that even high-bandwidth
carriers have strenuously tried to avoid because of the inherent
fluctuations in Internet connection speeds and the potential liability for
underperformance.2 °6
Second, proposing tax incentives to expand broadband is an adequate
start in addressing the problem of limited new investments in broadband
connections. However, tax incentives should be coupled with significantly
more free competition because without significant potential competitors,
even tax incentives will not spur increased investments.0 7
Finally, as in previous proposals, the Tiered Services proposal notes
the wisdom of establishing FCC enforcement of rule violations. 20 ' In
order to achieve positive results, an entity, such as the FCC, must be
given the power to enforce the rules.
E. WTO Annex on Telecommunications
A major obstacle for a non-neutral international consensus is the
WTO's Annex on Telecommunications agreement. 20 9 This agreement,
of which the United States is a signatory, requires that a member allow
foreign usage of the telecommunications network on a non-discriminatory
basis.210  At first blush, the WTO Annex appears to require that a
network be neutral to all foreign content. However, a more careful reading
shows that there are several caveats that limit the ability to strictly
enforce this neutral policy.
211
Federal Communications Commission, What is Broadband?, http://www.fcc. gov/cgb/broad
band.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
206. See, e.g., Broadbandlnfo.com, Internet Speeds Inconsistent with Advertised
Maximum Broadband Speed, http://www.broadbandinfo.com/news/isp-speedometers.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2007). The connection speed to any one location on the Internet is
often entirely independent of the potential speed from the so-called "last mile" of
connection from the ISP to the consumer. ISPs frequently trump the potential for a
certain speed because they are unable to guarantee an actual speed.
207. Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 205, at 56.
208. Id.
209. See GATS Telecom Annex, supra note 142.
210. Id.
211. Id. at art. 5(a) (noting that the Annex is intended to be read so that each
member regulates domestic companies that provide telecommunications services in a
manner consistent with the obligations and expectations enumerated in the Annex). A
notable problem facing the WTO is the same problem of service identification that
plagues United States telecom law. As the United States makes a noteworthy distinction
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Notably, section 5(g) allows a developing country to opt out of the
regulations as long as the restrictions are "reasonable" to "strengthen its
domestic telecommunications infrastructure. 212 The result of this limitation
is that certain countries can establish a roughly non-neutral network as
long as they are sufficiently underdeveloped or if it is in their best
interest.
Additionally, section 5(f) stipulates that even though a country must
allow others to use their telecommunications networks, it can limit the
usage of certain technical interfaces and standards.213  This limitation
allows a country to use a technical standard to engage in content or
service blocking. For instance, if a new type of VoIP was developed in
Germany that was vastly superior to any current offerings in the United
States, telecommunications companies in the United States could
attempt to block the service under the guise of technical interoperability,
alleging that the new VoIP does not meet interfacing standards. 2 14
Nevertheless, a benefit of the WTO Agreement is that it enshrines
content and service neutrality into the enforcement provisions of the
GATS dispute resolution system, a positive step to international recognition
of the importance of neutrality principles.Z15
V. RECOMMENDATION
By combining the several useful provisions from previously discussed
proposals and existing frameworks, I suggest a new proposal to aid in
accomplishing a desirable network based upon a neutral platform. This
recommendation contains five provisions that aim to bind the market to
regulations that establish a neutrality principle, while still giving
incentives for the implementation of desirable non-neutral platforms. These
provisions include 1) implementing a statutory interconnection proposal to
between "telecommunications services" and "information services," the WTO
distinguishes between "basic" and "value-added" telecommunications services. WTO,
Coverage of Basic Telecommunications and Value-Added Services, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/serv-e/telecome/telecomcoverage e.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007)
(basic services include any rudimentary voice service, and value-added services include
anything that has more than basic, including all Internet services).
212. GATS Telecom Annex, supra note 142, at art. 5(g).
213. Id. at art. 5(f)(ii).
214. But see id. at art. 5(f)(iii) (requiring the implementation of interoperability in
communications if the technical standard is adopted as a "global" standard). For an
illustration of blocking, see Bangeman, supra note 85.
215. Id.
treat a competitor's data as a carrier would treat its own; 2) adopting a
transparent neutrality stance where content blocking is disfavored but
provisions are available to enable development of desirable non-neutrality
in niche markets; 3) tax incentives for expansion of neutral services;
4) WTO enforcement of non-neutral government positions and the
elimination of exceptions for "technical incompatibilities;" and 5) empowering
the FCC to enforce actions against offenders.
A. A New Statutory Interconnection Proposal
By utilizing a statutory interconnection proposal that requires telecom
companies to treat a competitor's data in the same manner as they treat
their own, a de facto neutrality standard could be established. The
interconnection proposal would be based upon Speta's proposal and
require a company to provide connectivity to a competitor's services if
the company has market power in a specific location. However, while
Speta's proposal only requires parity between the ISP's service offering
and an equivalent service offered by a competitor, a new proposal should
go further and require parity when the ISP and its competitor do not
offer the same service. This would deter companies from creating
complex partnerships with third-party content providers to skirt the rule.
Additionally, removing the requirement of competing services would
solve an identified flaw in Speta's proposal: blocking a service when the
telecom company has a substitute service. By requiring a market-power
telecom company to transport all data equally, there would be no advantage
in discriminating in favor of a substitute service.
While this new interconnection proposal may work in the United
States, it would have to overcome European content restraints. Since
content restrictions are well ingrained in European custom, the United
States should tactically insist only on reciprocation from the European
Union in the neutrality of services, not content. In practice, this would
result in a situation where the French may still ban the sale of Nazi
paraphernalia or similar objectionable material, but they could not block
the website or the Internet services providing the sale.
B. The Neutrality List
Any new neutrality policy should also make all explicit content
blocking and filtration transparent to customers of an ISP and regulators.
This policy could take a form similar to the FCC CAN-SPAM Unwanted
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Commercial Electronic Mail list.2 16 That program was an effort by the
FCC, authorized by the 2003 CAN-SPAM Act,2 1 7 to compile a list of
domains used by mobile wireless devices so that commercial marketers
could not transmit unwanted messages. 218 If companies created a similar
list to identify and track the blocking of websites and services in an
effort to form a self-reporting mechanism, it would be invaluable both as
an FCC regulatory tool and as an information resource for the discerning
consumer.
1. Benefits
Also two significant benefits would be achieved by requiring, even
retroactively, a company to list and describe any type of filtration and
blocking that it is doing on its network. First, the list would give notice
to all consumers as to what the company blocks. Consumers could then
make educated decisions as to whether they want to subscribe to the
company's service. Second, by allowing some blocking and filtration,
consumers could still get some of the benefits of non-neutrality, namely
the blocking of SPAM, computer viruses, child pornography, and other
undesirable content.
216. This list would be more useful to regulators than consumers because it would
likely confuse or frustrate consumers due to either its voluminous length or the
insufficient explanation as to why something was blocked. For example, many
consumers could benefit from an ISP actively blocking spam messages emanating from
specific IP addresses, especially those from foreign countries that are fraud. However,
for a customer to digest the list of sparn addresses and all the actions taken by the ISP
would be cumbersome at best. There is a risk that spammers may get a hold of the list
and determine which spamming tactics work and which need adjustment. However, this
risk is minimal in comparison to the potential utility of the list. It is noteworthy that
many ISP's are currently combatting spam messaging using the same blocking technique
discussed here. However, ISP's often do this type of blocking behind the scenes, leading
to the obvious consumer benefits of reducing spain messages but also leading to
unintended negative consequences. See Paul Festa, Comcast Goofs in Russian Spam Blockade,
C[NET NEWS.COM, Mar. 2, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1038 3-5168643.html (noting
that for four days, Comcast, one of the largest ISP's in the United States, in an effort to
deal with spam, unintentionally blocked all email messages coming from .ru domains,
Russia's assigned domain address).
217. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-
SPAM) Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000).
218. Public Notice, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, The Consumer & Governmental
Affairs Bureau Announces the Availability of a Wireless Domain Names List (Feb. 7,
2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-05 -33 A 1 .pdf.
219. A "service" could be defined in much the same way as an "information
service" is defined in the Telecommunications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
2. Drawbacks
The major drawback of having companies create self-reporting lists is
that subtle, Chinese-style filtration could still be used, making it difficult
for competing services to get a foothold in a non-neutral network. For
example, an ISP that wants to avoid having to report outright blocking
could instead use the troubling subtle filtration technique to give
preference to its services over those of its rivals. However, subtle filtration
is a violation of the interconnection rule. Thus, an ISP would have the
choice between reporting the blocking of data and services or treating all
data equally.
Another drawback of this self-reporting proposal is that it raises many
questions regarding procedural issues. For instance, what would constitute
a non-neutral action? Would it entail explicit blocking of sites, or would
subtle filtration suffice? How would subtle filtration be measured?
What type of explanation would accompany a listed site or service?
Who would monitor the list and allegations of blocking or filtration?
Who would pay for this system? These questions do not have obvious
answers, and while they are beyond the scope of this article, they are
important and call for further discussion in creating appropriate regulatory
definitions and standards. Additionally, following the lead of the Internet
Governance Forum, there is an opportunity during the creation of these
United States' neutrality standards to engage the international community in
establishing a worldwide neutrality model based upon the twin goals of
open competition and anti-protectionist measures. 220
C. Tax Incentives and Competition
Increasing tax incentives for companies that comply with standards of
neutrality will go a long way in encouraging content and services
neutrality. However, tax incentives should only be coupled with increased
competition if international consensus is reached on what constitutes
220. Protectionist measures include the widely-publicized keyword filtering required for
any search engine company by the Chinese government. While not a traditional net
neutrality issue because there was no actual technological solution or blocking at the
transport level, the results were similar and as result billions of Chinese citizens could
not access certain websites through major United States search engines. See Press Release,
Chris Smith, Congressman N.J. 4th Dist., Smith Criticizes Google for Caving to China's
Demand for Internet Censorship, Jan. 25, 2006, www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nj04_
smith/printernetchina.html; Lester Haines, Google and Yahoo! Take a Beating, THE
REGISTER, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/02/16/china-committee/.
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"market power" in a region and then policies and regulations are
formulated to increase competition.
221
To accomplish the goal of expanding neutrality-based services, incentives
must be tailored specifically to the development of a neutral network.
As previously shown, a major fear of neutrality proponents is that all
new broadband investments will be in non-neutral, content filtered
platforms, while the neutral network will only encompass the slower
existing network. In such a situation, a tiered network structure would exist
where the consumer is forced to either stay at the same neutral-based low
broadband speed or pay a premium for a faster, non-neutral broadband
network. To prevent this undesirable scenario, all tax incentives and
regulations, including negotiations for merger approvals, should be based
upon a company's agreement to neutrality. For example, the AT&T-
BellSouth merger consent decree by the FCC contained provisions that
would ensure that the resulting company would maintain "network
neutrality" for three years.222  While the fine print in the agreement
seems to suggest that AT&T really is not bound by network neutrality,
223
the intent was laudable. The FCC should take a stronger stance in requiring
companies to adhere to neutrality policies as a precondition to any merger
agreement. Additionally, Congress should attach the neutrality provision to
any appropriation or tax incentive given for future network expansion.
221. A major hurdle for an international net neutrality proposal is the varied
interpretations of anti-competitive behavior and market power between the United States
and the European Union. See Nenova, supra note 114.
222. AT&T Consent Decree, supra note 185, at 9.
223. Although there was an agreement to be non-neutral on the existing DSL
network, language in the agreement states that the neutrality commitment "does not
apply to the AT&T/BellSouth Internet Protocol television (IPTV) service." Id. at 3. This
omission is telling because as commentator David Burstein noted, AT&T considers the
IPTV service to be the next generation service. See David Burstein (commenting on an
article from Paul Kapustka), AT&T Knows When to Fold'em, GIGAOM, Dec. 29, 2006,
http://gigaom.com/2006/12/29/att-knows-when-to-fold-em/. Additionally, commentator
Susan Crawford has opined that AT&T is effectively saying, "We'll keep existing
'broadband' access neutral. But when it comes to our new super-duper 'AT&T Yahoo!
High Speed Internet U-verse Enabled,' well, that's not up for negotiation. We need to
make money there. 'Enabled' and 'broadband' are not the same thing." The Day the
Internet Became Cable Television, http://scrawford.blogware.com/blog/_archives/2006
/12/29/2604993.html (Dec. 29, 2006, 11:49 EST). Despite these obvious setbacks for
network neutrality proponents hoping for a truly neutral agreement, commentator Tim
Wu has hailed the agreement as an important first step toward neutrality, if for no other
reason than the fact that this is the first time the FCC has included neutrality language in
a broadband regulatory device. The AT&T Network Neutrality Agreement, http://www.
timwu.org/log/archives/81 #more-81 (Dec. 29, 2006, 02:18 EST).
D. A Role for the WTO
The WTO has a significant and important role to play in any
international neutrality consensus. The WTO should continue to enforce
regulations against anti-competitive behavior, including blocking or
filtration, on an international level. The WTO should also allow a country's
network to access outside information by removing the "technical
incompatibilities" exception.
E. FCC Enforcement
Since the FCC reclassified cable internet and DSL as "information
services," it is currently unclear whether the FCC has the authority to
enforce net neutrality under current law.224 Thus, Congress should
specifically give the FCC the authority to regulate Internet services,
regardless of the archaic distinction between services and historical
preference for deregulation.22 5
VI. CONCLUSION
In a broader context, the expanding capabilities and rapid innovation
of the Internet has rendered many of the traditional regulatory platforms
of the historical telecom industry either unnecessary or increasingly
burdensome. The international telecom market is complex. The above
discussion has shown that the international net neutrality debate is
significant, not only from a social impact and regulatory review perspective,
but, more importantly, from an economic perspective. While strong
contingents have emerged on both sides of the neutrality debate, room
for compromise exists with the enactment of varying principles of
openness and increased competition.
Without effective regulation, anti-competitive pressures will build to
form a multi-tiered Internet where many may pay higher prices for less
access. There must be a United States policy that is shaped by open
competition, is compatible with international standards and enforcement
procedures, and is sensitive to various countries' notions of neutrality in
224. Windhausen, supra note 167, at 12; see also Joint Statement, Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, & Deborah Taylor Tate, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns.
Comm'n, Re: AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control,
WC Docket No. 06-74, Dec. 29, 2006, available at http://fjall foss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
attachmatch/DOC-269275A2.pdf (in a follow-up to the merger agreement, FCC Chairman
Martin stated that despite the network neutrality language included in the
AT&T/BellSouth merger, the AT&T concessions "in no way bind future Commission
action" and that he will not enforce a net neutrality principle).
225. For a thorough history of United States government actions and statements on
the potential for net neutrality regulation, see Windhausen, supra note 167, at 13-16.
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content and services. Such a solution will allow for the realization of the
benefits of both neutrality and non-neutrality and keep the Internet open
to outside innovation and progress.
212
